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Abstract: 
This article is about Pakistan’s foreign policy with United States of America specifically during Musharraf era. 
The article studies that since its independence, Pakistan has faced advantageous and disadvantageous situations 
that yield to periodic ups and downs in the association with USA. However, Retired General Pervez Musharraf’s 
era have important and significant insights that hold special value in the history of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The 
tragic incident of 9/11 placed Pakistan initially, in a very favorable position where U.S and Pakistan shook their 
hands for the long term mutual benefits. Pakistan was expected to play their role on war against terrorism and in 
return U.S aid will provide development in social and economic sectors in Pakistan. Since 9/11, both states 
witnessed an era of close ties with shared interests. Conclusively, President Musharraf realized that he has been 
struck in a complex situation between Taliban and US along with national and international criticism, possible 
threat from India and country’s future at stake. The article studies the details of this era and tries to rationalize 
President’s hidden motives. 
History of United States and Pakistan Relationship: A Brief Overview: 
The period of 68-years of independence of Islamic Republic of Pakistan has witnessed both engagement and 
disengagement in terms of relationship with US. Since independence, Pakistan’s account of foreign policy has 
documented episodes of courtship and periods of distrust.  
Beholding over the past, the history reveals that the Pakistan’s emergence on the international stage was not 
supposed of any certain implications by the US. However, beginning in the 1950s the two independent states 
came into each other’s terms as a result of Cold war pressures and the politics of South Asia, and that resulted in 
Pakistan being regarded as America’s ‘most allied ally in Asia’(Kux, 2001) 
When Jinnah died on 11 September 1948, that is just one year after the independence from Great Britain, the 
newly independent state was mounted at a very crucial point. Both India and Pakistan were at the inception of 
the Cold War and for the sake of their future, both anew independent states needed to make a decision about 
their respective alignment. In a little while after the freedom, India and Pakistan were confronted with the 
dilemma of aligning either with the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although 
India promptly availed the opportunities to make promising and favorable relations with the USSR, Pakistani 
leaders that took their educations from Western institutions and thus were highly impressed with western 
management, opted for aligning with the West. Correspondingly, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of 
Pakistan, gave priority to visit Washington in 1950, instead of visiting Moscow and postponed the invitation of 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. 
The 33rd President of the United States Harry S.Truman (1945-1952) generally remained indifferent and 
uninterested toward Pakistan from 1947 to 1952. When Eisenhower started his administration era in January 
1953, the US government became increasingly anxious and concerned about the extent of communism to Asia 
and started to take an interest in Pakistan. This interest and concern concluded in the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Agreement By mid 1950s Pakistan also became a member of military alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. This result in better and healthy US-Pakistan relationship and 
the alliance between the two, continued to improve as Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization 
in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organization in 1956. A main pillar of the affiliation undoubtedly was the 
military cooperation between the two countries, which flourished through an active training exchange program 
and the fielding of US arms and armament to Pak military. While initially reluctant and uninterested, the US 
went on to provide economic and military aid to Pakistan for their own benefit. However, during the 1965 India-
Pakistan war, the US seized martial aid to Pakistan. A fruitless and ineffective coordination developed during the 
1971 crisis in East Pakistan. US again in 1980’s, took interest in Pakistan and build up their bond due to the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which provided an opportunity for intensive and serious engagement. 
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Pakistan became the channel for the US war effort alongside the Soviet Union. However after the Soviets left 
Afghanistan in 1989, the relationship between the two countries again began to sour. In the 1990s the Bush 
Administration invoked the Presler Amendment, cutting military assistance and spare parts for weaponry. The 
Clinton Administration, initially, did show some sympathy and consideration for the Pakistani especially on the 
burning issue of Kashmir, but throughout the whole year of 1990, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, associations 
with terrorist groups and progressive conversion into radicalized Islamic society tensed relations between the 
two countries. The major breakthrough was the 9/11 attack. The 9/11 attack appear to dubbed a ‘major non-
NATO ally’ (Alan Kronstadt, 2009). But by this time the inconsistencies in the US–Pak relationship had gained 
a new direction and intensity. Hussein Haqqani’ s observation reflected in his book that ‘Pakistan cannot easily 
be characterized as either friend or foe’(Haqqani, 2005). Till now, relations between these two states have been 
characterized by engagement, concern, indifference, considerations, disagreements, disengagement, tensions and 
alliance. Even the analyst predicted that the high-lows of the relationship will persist in future. The foreign 
relation was considered as such an association that seems to have frayed and yet has persisted. Clearly, much ink 
has been split in attempts to comprehend when, how and why these states have joined their hands with each 
other. The literature regarding the history of US-Pakistan relationship and its ups and downs is comprehensive, 
detailed and humbling, and yet as we bury ourselves in the historical insides of this association, we are puzzled 
by anomalies and variances that evident enough to question reasoning and demand explanations. 
The Era of 1999–2008 in terms of US-Pakistan Relationship: 
As said prior, the Clinton Administration did show the interest and tried to improve the relationship by providing 
assistance and sympathy on the issue of Kashmir. Clinton administration also supported the Pakistani stand on 
Kashmir issue, however the escalating consideration became sour when Pakistan gradually became a radicalized 
Islamic society with the growing connections with extremists and terrorist groups and overall support and 
encouragement for Taliban. Then in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf took over and this coup was received with 
a combination of apprehension and equanimity by the US. However the 9/11 attacks gave a completely new 
direction to the Pakistan’s foreign policy. The 9/11 attack changed the US–Pakistan relations to the point that by 
2004 Pakistan was labelled as a ‘major non-NATO ally’ (Alan Kronstadt, 2009)but along with that, the 
contradictions and conflicts between the two states also gained some depth. 
The history of post-1999 phase has shown a qualitative amplification in interactions through diplomatic visits 
between these two countries. This change is exemplified by the regular exchange of visits by senior officials and 
politicians, the extraction of various sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the transfer of weapons and provision of aid. 
Pakistan was no longer considered an outcast or has the near pariah status that it had just prior to the 9/11 
attacks. That being said, the bilateral relations over the course have been strained on multiple occasions, though 
there was no serious effect on relations. The events of September 11 set in motion the process of re-engagement. 
The US set aside its hesitation regarding the Musharraf dictatorship and took the first step to positive relationship 
through visits of top political and military leaders from US. In return Pakistan also sent her prominent officials to 
US. Also, to make a positive promise, the US cancelled a series of sanctions against Pakistan and renewed aid 
(Epstein, Susan, & Kronstadt, 2012). While this aid and assistance was particularly meant to help Pakistan’s 
expansion towards equipment and training of Pakistani security forces and increasing border security, it was also 
somewhat directed towards health, education, food, democracy promotion, human rights and narcotics 
(Kronstadt, 2007). Security cooperation between the two countries has witnesses denote worthy transfer of 
weapons and military equipment to Pakistan (Epstein, Susan, & Kronstadt, 2012). Between 2002 and 2009 the 
experts believe that Pakistan received $15.3 billion in reimbursements and assistance from the US (Alan 
Kronstadt, 2009). With the passage of time, political analysts believe that Pakistan gradually became more 
integrated into the American strategy by allowing the US military to use bases and permission to serve as a 
communication route to Afghanistan which result in tightening the border. Pakistan also helped in identification 
and detainment of extremists and formally banning militant groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-
Taiba. By 2002 the US military and law execution personnel began openly assisting in the trepidation of 
suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In fact, by late 2005 and 2006 there were intelligences that the US 
propelled undeviating missile occurrences on Al Qaeda goals (Kronstadt, 2007). Lately, Pakistan also claimed to 
have apprehended at least 750 Al Qaeda suspects and handed them over to the US. Several important arrests 
were made in Pakistan, including Al Qaeda members such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi 
bin al-Shibh and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (Kronstadt, 2007). 
Post 9/11: 
The significant event of 11 September 2001 had a dramatic impact on US-Pakistan relations and thus it is 
considered a crucial point in timeline of US-Pak relationship. President Musharraf was prompt in extending full 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.6, No.2, 2016 
 
70 
support to America by encouraging war against terrorism. He enthusiastically agreed to all requests by Secretary 
of State Colin Powell. According to a number of sources, his positive response was considered as beyond 
expectations (Amir, 2001).With such prompt responses, certain questions were being raised by political analysts 
and President Musharraf has been frequently criticized within Pakistan for cooperating too readily and 
compromising on too many things particularly on national security to the United States without the demand of 
any adequate recompense (Amir, 2001). The most probable reason for his plainspoken response could be his 
foresight that America and Pakistan together census due the radical religious and terrorist elements growing 
within the region, particularly in Pakistan President Musharraf’s whole-hearted support to the United States 
subsequently helped building a stronger affiliation between the two nations (Gastright, 2005) 
As it is already known that General Musharraf condemned the 9/11 misfortune as the “most brutal and horrible 
act of terrorism” and in his message to President Bush, he had said that the world must unite to fight against 
terrorism in all its forms and root out this evil (Dawn, September 12, 2001). Pakistan was asked to provide 
logistical support to the U.S. military along with the use of Pakistani airspace, if needed, and to share all the 
information and intelligence on suspected terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden and his followers in Afghanistan. 
U.S. had already given seven point demand list to Pakistan, which has been mentioned below. Washington had 
also asked for a complete and detailed report from the ISI on Bin Laden, including his contacts with Pakistani 
and other Islamic militant organizations. Pakistan ultimately negotiated with the U.S.A. that no combat missions 
would be carried out from its territory and, instead of given unlimited over-flight rights, an air corridor was 
assigned to U.S. planes. Pakistan was agreed to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban immediately, yet 
American administration delayed it on purpose. Christina Rocca, The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 
discussed with Ambassador Lodhi that Pakistan should keep the political network open with the Taliban until the 
U.S. incursion was accomplished (Hussain, 2007, p. 37).In this respect General Musharraf met with his Cabinet 
and national security team. The question rose whether the Pakistani government would permit and admit the 
strains made by the United States. Corps Commanders saw in Islamabad, trusting that they could dialogue 
without the jeopardy of U.S. scrutiny in a highly protected setting. Nine corps commanders and dozen other 
high-ranking staff officers at the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) were in attending, including the chiefs of 
the ISI and MI. General Musharraf did not find it hard to coax his nominated civilian cabinet, but it was not that 
much suave when it came to his top commanders and members of his military administration. There was a 
comprehensive detachment over the matter. At least four topmost commanders, with General Mahmood who had 
previously, in Washington, contracted on the dotted line, revealed uncertainties on the verdict to offer unreserved 
sustenance to the United States in its war on Afghanistan. LT. General Mohammed Aziz, Corps Commander 
Lahore, Lt.-General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani, Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, and Lt.-General Muzaffar Usmani, 
Deputy Chief of Army Staff, were amongst those who disparate pulling out support for the Taliban regime. They 
had all played key roles in the 1999 military coup. Musharraf, however, had the backing off other Corps 
Commanders. It was a precarious situation for him. (Hussain, 2007, p. 41) 
General Musharraf persuaded with a convincing explanation of why Pakistan had to stand with America and 
how Pakistan is not in a position to face dreadful consequences by US. He told them that Pakistan faced a blunt 
choice—it could either join the U.S. coalition that was supported by the United Nations Security Council, or 
expect to be declared as a terrorist state, leading to economic sanctions. 
However, General Musharraf was under enormous burden, both nationally and internationally, on how to 
proceed concerning U.S. demands and expectations. While talking to a gathering of retired generals, diplomats, 
and politicians, on September 18, Musharraf argued that the decision to extend “unstinting support” to the 
United States was taken in the face of fears and due to immense pressure, that in case of denial, a direct military 
action from the alliance of the United States, India, and Israel was very much expected against Pakistan (Khan, 
September 14 2001) 
On 19 September, General Musharraf looked strained as he appeared on state television to explain why he had 
decided to side with the U.S.A. on the stance of war on terror. He justified his decision saying it was done to 
save the country’s strategic assets, for the defense of Kashmir and prevent Pakistan from being declared a 
terrorist state (Hussain, 2007, p. 41) 
This speech to his nation was clear about what was at stake for Pakistan. If it did not join the U.S. war effort, the 
country would be downgraded, isolated or labelled as “extremist”. Also it is noteworthy that India had already 
offered its full support and cooperation to the United States, which means refusal to US may result in loss of any 
remaining international sympathy for the Pakistani position on Kashmir. He was perplexed about the survival of 
Pakistan’s hard-won nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (Washington Post, Online, 2001) Thus with this 
scenario, he offered five reasons for choosing this course of action: 
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i). Secure strategic assets of Pakistan 
ii). The Kashmir issue should be safeguarded 
iii). Preclude Pakistan from being professed as a terrorist state  
iv). Avert an anti-Pakistani government from impending power in Kabul  
v). Pakistan re-emerged diplomatically as an accountable and distinguished nation. It was expected that the chief 
powers would range collaboration to the United States in grueling the terrorists. None would compete with a 
probable U.S. verdict to stand an outbreak against the Taliban. No resistance would be seeked, or measured 
essential, of Taliban involvement with bin Laden. 
Pakistan has been supposed to play a vital and active role in the war on terrorism; that contributed two opinions 
among the general public of Pakistan. There are those who constructed the notion that Pakistan’s support for the 
war on terrorism is being sustained solely due to the efforts of President Pervez Musharraf’s personality alone— 
and also that it does not reflect the true priorities of the country’s general public as well as it is not in consensus 
with Pakistan’s national interests. Interestingly, on the contrary the other notion is based on the same argument 
which is being used by Musharraf’s political opponents as well as some of his supporters. His political 
opponents and the anti-US lobby try to imply that assisting US on the war against terrorism is extremely 
unpopular in Pakistan and a larger fraction of populace disagrees with the General Musharraf’s policy. This 
segment argues that President Musharraf is fighting an unholy and unfavorable war to please the Americans and 
that he should be removed from power. On the other hand, the President’s supporters, emphasize that it is only 
President Musharraf who has clear terms and can provide unrestricted and unhampered Pakistani support on the 
subject of war against terrorism. If this is supposed to be true, then his continuation of presidency is central to 
the interests of the United States as well as to the Pakistan. Both arguments miss the mark and undermine 
President Musharraf’s personal security. It should be obvious that the perception that this policy is dependent on 
the individual has led to multiple attempts on the President’s life, at least two of which nearly succeeded. In fact, 
President Musharraf’s opposition to religious extremism began well before 9/11. 
President Musharraf’s efforts to minimize the effects of extremism and eliminate religious radicalization began 
to strike long before being advanced by the United States following 9/11. Furthermore, a large majority of 
Pakistanis do not share the Islamists’ vision of the future of the country and are concerned about the growth of 
extremism. It is unfortunate that Pakistan lack the direction for its vision since its emergence as sudden death of 
Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 left Pakistan in abeyance and the declaration of the clear vision 
for the state remained an unfinished business. This resulted in confusion and ambiguity among the populace of 
Pakistan. On a broader view, it is considered that majority of Pakistani are afraid of intensification of religious 
extremism in the country Consider, for example, Pakistan’s 2002 general election: The Pakistan Muslim League 
(Quaid) and its associated parties that supported President Musharraf’s political ideology at that time, won in 
three of the four provinces and were able to form a central government as well as three provincial governments. 
On the other hand, the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religious political parties, who were at 
that time running against Pervez Musharraf’s political ideology and were very rigid towards US aid, won its 
seats primarily within the Pukhtun area of the tribal-dominated NWFP. Hussain Haqqani said, “Despite the 
MMA’s unparalleled electoral recital in 2002, the coalition (MMA) gathered only 11 percent of the entire votes 
troupe; the Islamist vote as a percentage of total recorded voters has been more or less immobile since the 
1970s.” (Haqqani, 2005) 
Furthermore, the penalties of negative retort of President to US could effect in drawbacks. Many radical 
predictors rely on that after 9/11 occurrence, Pakistan was left with no optimal excepting an assertion to US 
demands. General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was given an official list of the U.S. demands. Armitage 
said, ‘This is not passable,’ as he gave him a solitary sheet of paper with a list of seven demands that the Bush 
government wanted him to receive. The General, glanced through the paper, read the demands and then forward 
it on to Ambassador Lodhi. Before he could start analysis of the paper, General Mahmood replied, ‘They are all 
suitable to us’. The unexpected and instantaneous reply took left everyone in the room astounded and 
particularly all Pakistani officials amazed. ‘These are very authoritative words, General. Don’t you want to 
converse this with your President?’ he asked. ‘I know the President’s intention,’ replied General Mahmood. A 
reassured Armitage asked General Mahmood to see with Tenet at his headquarters at Langley. ‘He is waiting for 
you,’ said Armitage (Hussain, 2007). 
The famous seven demands were as follows: 
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i) Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, 
and end all logistical support. 
ii) Give blanket overflight and landing rights to U.S. aircrafts.  
iii) Give the U.S. access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  
iv) Give all intelligence and immigration information.  
v) Condemn the September 11 attacks and restrain all local expressions of support for terrorism.  
vii) Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan. 
vii) Note that, the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and 
should the Taliban continue to anchorage him and his collaborators, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with 
the Taliban regime, and support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the aforementioned ways to destroy 
Osama and his network.  
This was undeniably forth coming threat to Pakistan as President Bush declared that, “either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (U.S.) or with barbarism and evil (Them). 
Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly, beware.” (Fani, July, 2004) 
As compared to the relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the era of 1980s, present-day 
collaboration, although originated as a result of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, has developed 
along a more sophisticated agenda. Instead of a one time or one item agenda focused entirely or solely on the 
war on terrorism, Pakistan has used the existing situation of improved relations to pursue a broad series of issues 
that can help Pakistan in longer run. The policies pursued by the government of President Musharraf have 
proven to be in the finest interest of both Pakistan and the United States in both the short and long-term. This 
comprehensive approach consolidates national views related to globalization, the abolition of militancy, 
economic development, and democratization. The US government has also sincerely sought to reduce Pakistan’s 
foreign debt. Besides using its influence on G8 countries for economic cooperation, the United States ’was 
facilitated Pakistan’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). America has also promised to 
remove all sanctions imposed on Pakistan and lately has reassured the country’s leadership that its nuclear 
weapon competency is acceptable. The United States and Pakistan are also united on matters related to nuclear 
limitation, agreeing to resolve the proliferation issues involving Dr. Qadeer Khan founder of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program, in a mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial manner.  
With regard to Pakistan’s economy, President Musharraf has enacted macroeconomic measures to remove the 
country from its long-term debt trap. According to the CIA Fact Book, “IMF-approved government policies, 
strengthened by generous foreign assistance and renewed access to global markets since 2001, have generated 
solid macroeconomic recovery in the last three years. The government has made substantial macroeconomic 
reforms since 2000.... While long-term prospects remain uncertain, given Pakistan’s low level of development, 
medium-term prospects for job creation and poverty reduction are the best in nearly a decade.” (The World Fact 
Book: Pakistan, n.d.) 
In addition, “Islamabad has elevated development spending from about 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s to 4 
percent in 2003. GDP growth, stimulated by double-digit gains in industrial production over the past year, has 
now become less dependent on agriculture. Foreign exchange reserves continued to reach new heights in 2004, 
supported by strong export growth and steady worker remittances.” (The World Fact Book: Pakistan, 
n.d.)Surely, Pakistan was enjoying an economic recovery. The past fiscal year has indeed been fruitful for 
Pakistan’s economy, recording several multiyear “firsts.” Pakistan’s real GDP growth of 8.4 percent in 2004-05 
is the most rapid in two decades. Pakistan was stood as the second fastest growing economy after China in 2004-
05. It witnessed the largest expansion of private sector credit in the 2004-05 timeframe. Pakistan’s exit from the 
IMF Program was indeed considered as an important milestone; and the country’s public and external debt 
burden declined to their lowest levels in decades (Report on Economic Survey , 2004-05) 
The government has also introduced standardized subjects in 8,000 Madaris in an effort to bridge the gap 
between madrassas and the formal education system. The government’s involvement is designed to strengthen 
the lines of communication between the madrassas and the government, educate over 1.5 million students, and 
help eradicate extremism throughout the country (Ullah, 2006) 
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The US government was taking a keen interest in supporting Pakistan’s education reforms; having already 
invested about $100 million. According to the State Department, the United States had a long-term vision for 
Pakistan’s education system and also planned to support modernization of Pakistan’s engineering and high 
technology sectors. (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2006) Additionally, the government of Pakistan 
made a commitment to democratization. The government is now in the hands of designated councils who aid in a 
legitimate parliament. A tremendously daring and eventually prevalent step by the leadership is due to the 
transmission  resistor of local government to nominated representatives. These and other liberal ingenuities by 
President Musharraf as part of his strategy of transformation and rational moderation are not only important for 
Pakistan’s long-term objectives; they also aid the long-term securities of the United States associated to 
globalization, annihilation of radicalism, and democratization. 
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